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1 Introduction
Tax revenue as a proportion of GDP is typically 20% lower in African coun-
tries than in rich OECD countries. Yet one of the salient features of African
countries is an apparent under-provision of public goods in areas such as
health, basic education or infrastructure. If there are unrealized benefits from
public spending, why isn’t taxation increased to enable more public projects
to be undertaken? There are various possible responses to this question, and
the answer may be different in different countries. Some African govern-
ments may not have the objective of maximizing social well-being, and so
may under-provide public goods. Perhaps the assumption of high returns to
public spending is false in practice, possibly because of inefficient or corrupt
implementation of projects. Or perhaps the opportunity cost of public funds
is higher in African countries than in rich countries. The paper explores
this last response. It examines the marginal cost of public funds (MCF) -
the change in social welfare associated with raising an additional unit of tax
revenue using a particular tax instrument - in 38 African countries.
Measures of MCF are central to cost-benefit analysis for public expendi-
tures. At a theoretical optimum, the marginal benefit of public expenditure
would be equal to the marginal cost of public funds, which would be equal
across all tax instruments. Socially desirable projects yield social rates of re-
turn greater than the MCF. More importantly estimates of MCF are crucial
to determine the next challenge in the reform of African tax structures: the
same revenue can be obtained at lower welfare cost by increasing a tax with
a low MCF and lowering a tax with a high MCF.
The central role of the MCF in public economy is well known. The liter-
ature on this topic dates back at least thirty years, but it is almost entirely
focused on the tax systems of the high income countries. For methodological
reasons existing estimates are not all truly comparable. Table 1 summarizes
existing estimates. We know of only one African country, Cameroon, for
which the MCF has been estimated. Perhaps the major reason for the rela-
tive paucity of MCF estimates in developing countries has been the amount
of data required and the time expense of creating and calibrating the com-
putable general equilibrium (CGE) models used for estimation. Substitution
effects, which are at the heart of the dead-weight loss of taxation, are poorly
captured by partial equilibrium analysis. CGEs are required because real
tax systems are complex, and because it is necessary to take account of mul-
tiple interactions within tax systems. The general equilibrium interactions
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between tax instruments are illustrated in Figure 2 section 4.1.1
Thus, the challenge as we have conceived it is to develop a simple CGE
model that can be calibrated with little more than national accounts data,
and which can be used to provide consistent estimates comparable across
African countries. To be useful for tax policy analysis, the model should
take account of the major classes of taxes in African countries: taxes on do-
mestic goods, exports, imports, corporate income tax, and personal income
tax. On average, in the sub-Saharan African countries that we examine, these
taxes represent respectively 25%, 3%, 35%, 13%, and 14% of tax revenue,
with the remaining 10% coming from other sources.2 Another key require-
ment for realism is that the model should take account of the existence of
informal sectors, which occupy a larger part of the economy in Africa than
elsewhere. For example, Schneider & Enste (2000) report the shadow econ-
omy occupied on average 15% of GDP in OECD countries in 1990, but 27%
in Botswana and 76% in Nigeria.3 We might suspect that in countries with
larger informal sectors, it is easier for economic agents to shift from formal
to informal activity. Greater substitutability would lead to higher marginal
costs of taxation on formal activity. The presence of an informal sector has
been shown to have a noticeable effect on MCF estimates in Canada.4
In addition to their economic effect, including informal sectors avoids
a calibration problem. CGE models have sometimes applied ‘effective’ tax
rates, calculated as tax revenues divided by sector size. This results in low
modelled tax rates. Effective tax rates provide an average between taxpayers
who pay tax at something like the legal rate, subject to some under-reporting,
and informal producers or consumers who pay no tax. Effective tax rates
underestimate the marginal tax rate incurred by those who actually pay tax.
Models using effective tax rates are thus likely to underestimate MCFs.5
1To provide the intuition for the effects of key parameters, analytical models with
minimal data requirements were used in initial development of the theory (e.g. Stuart
(1984), Mayshar (1991), Snow & Warren (1996)). But there are limits to the complexity
of models that can be solved analytically.
2Eighteen countries in our sample do not use export taxes. Among the twenty countries
that do use them export taxes constitute 7% of tax revenue.
3These figures are estimated using physical input methods.
4Fortin & Lacroix (1994) suggest the informal sector accounts for around 0.02-0.05 of
their MCF estimates of 1.39-1.53 for labour taxation in Canada. They note that although
small, the impact of the informal sector increases rapidly with the level of the marginal
tax rate. The importance of the informal sector when analyzing taxation in developing
countries is also emphasized in other settings in recent papers by García Peñalosa &
Turnovsky (2003) and Emran & Stiglitz (2005).
5It seems that the models used by Devarajan, Suthiwart-Narueput & Thierfelder (2001)
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Our paper makes several contributions to the literature on MCFs. The
first is the development of a simple general equilibrium model that can handle
taxes on the five major tax classes, takes account of the existence of informal
sectors, can be calibrated with little more than national accounts data, and
can be easily reproduced by other researchers for other countries. After a
brief review of the existing literature in section 2, we present the model in
section 3. It is inspired by the minimal data requirements of the ‘1-2-3 model’
of Devarajan et al. (1994). The basic 1-2-3 model has one country with two
producing sectors and three goods: a domestic good, exports and imports.
This model is extended to include production of an informal good, and four
factors of production: formal capital, informal capital, formal labour and
informal labour. Our definition of an informal good or factor is one on which
no tax is paid. As a side product of the calibration exercise, the paper hence
proposes several measures of the informal economy.
Section 4 contains the paper’s second important contribution: application
of the model to produce estimates of MCFs for taxes in 38 African countries,
vastly increasing the number of developing countries for which MCF esti-
mates exist. Sensitivity testing of the model reveals which elasticities are
the most important in determining MCF magnitudes, and suggests that our
base case estimates are reasonably robust for purposes of tax reform.
The paper’s third innovation, presented in section 5, is an investigation of
the marginal cost of raising funds in currently informal sectors, and the effect
of administrative costs on MCF estimates. We find that quite high levels of
administrative costs would be justified to extend taxation to currently exempt
informal sectors. Finally, in section 6 we examine the relationship between
dispersion of MCFs for different tax instruments and the scope for welfare
improving tax reform. We conclude in section 7.
apply ‘effective’ tax rates. For example their Cameroon model applies tax rates of 0.7%
for food and forestry, 2.5% for intermediate goods, 3.4% for construction, 6% for services,
7.4% for food and consumption, and 19.1% for cash crops. We do not have access to
the legal tax rates in force at the time the Cameroon model was created, but the current
VAT rate (which has replaced the previous system of sales taxes) is 18%, suggesting that
effective tax rates were indeed used in their model. The relatively high effective tax rate
for cash crops may be explained by noting that cash crops are largely exported. Exports
tend not to escape taxation, so the effective tax rate approximates a revenue-weighted
average of legal tax rates.
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Table 1: Selected MCF Estimates
Country Tax type Estimate Source
Australia Labour 1.19-1.24 Campbell & Bond (1997)
Australia Labour 1.28-1.55 Findlay & Jones (1982)
Australia Capital 1.21-1.48 Diewert & Lawrence (1998)
Australia Capital 1.15-1.51 Benge (1999)
Bangladesh Sales 0.95-1.07 Devarajan et al. (2001)
Bangladesh Import 1.17-2.18 Devarajan et al. (2001)
Cameroon Sales 0.48-0.96 Devarajan et al. (2001)
Cameroon Import 1.05-1.37 Devarajan et al. (2001)
Canada Commodity 1.25 Campbell (1975)
Canada Labour 1.38 Dahlby (1994)
Canada Labour 1.39-1.53 Fortin & Lacroix (1994)
China Sales 2.31 Laffont & Senik-Leygonie (1997)
India Excise 1.66-2.15 Ahmad & Stern (1987)
India Sales 1.59-2.12 Ahmad & Stern (1987)
India Import 1.54-2.17 Ahmad & Stern (1987)
Indonesia Sales 0.97-1.11 Devarajan et al. (2001)
Indonesia Import 0.99-1.18 Devarajan et al. (2001)
New Zealand Labour 1.18 Diewert & Lawrence (1994)
Sweden All taxes 1.69-2.29 Hansson & Stuart (1985)
United States All taxes 1.17-1.33 Ballard, Shoven & Whalley (1985)
United States Labour 1.21-1.24 Stuart (1984)
United States Labour 1.32-1.47 Browning (1987)
United States All taxes 1.47 Jorgenson & Yun (1990)
United States Labour 1.08-1.14 Ahmed & Croushore (1994)
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2 The Marginal Cost of Public Funds
The MCF measures the change in social welfare associated with raising an
additional unit of tax revenue using a particular tax instrument:
MCF = −∆W
∆R
(1)
where ∆W is a monetary measure of the change in social welfare and ∆R is
the change in tax revenue arising from a marginal change in a tax instrument.
The change in social welfare is a measure such as the equivalent variation or
change in consumer surplus. Useful reviews of the theoretical and empirical
literature on MCFs can be found in Ballard & Fullerton (1992) and Devarajan
et al. (2001). The literature is plagued by multiple definitions of the same
concepts. Different measures of the MCF for the same tax instrument can
be found according to:
• The nature of the tax experiment conducted. Ballard & Fullerton
(1992) identify two broad classes of theoretical analysis: ‘differential’
and ‘balanced budget.’ In differential analysis, one tax is marginally
increased and another is decreased sufficiently to maintain the bud-
get balance. The usual experiment is to increase a distortionary tax,
and to reduce a lump-sum tax (return the revenue to consumers as a
lump-sum). The income effects of the two tax changes cancel, leaving
only substitution effects. Estimates of the welfare change, ∆W , depend
on compensated elasticities, while the change in revenue, ∆R, can be
equated with the actual lump-sum transfer. In balanced-budget analy-
sis, one tax is marginally increased and the revenue is spent on a public
project. Income effects are included in the analysis, and MCF estimates
are derived using uncompensated elasticities. These are not the only
possible measures. Wildasin (1984) proposed a measure in which the
compensated change in welfare is divided by the compensated change
in tax revenue rather than the actual change in tax revenue.
• The choice of numeraire. Håkonsen (1998) has proposed an alternative
measure derived from the dual of the government’s optimal tax problem
(maximize revenue subject to a given level of social welfare) that is
invariant to the choice of numeraire.
• The attribution of some general equilibrium effects between benefit and
cost. Consider a marginal tax increase that increases revenue by one
dollar, before public spending occurs. Public spending could increase
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the tax base in a second round effect (for example, building highways
increases petrol tax revenue). If this second round effect is attributed
to the MCF, the increase in revenue is greater than one dollar, and
the MCF is accordingly reduced. But the second round effect could
equally well be attributed to a measure of the marginal benefit of public
spending. Mayshar (1991) proposed that all revenue effects of public
spending should be incorporated in the benefits measure (MBF), rather
than the MCF.
The consequence of this multiplicity of measures is that MCF estimates
prepared using different methodologies are not comparable. Fortunately,
Schöb (1994) has shown that standard MCF measures provide a valid basis
for revenue-neutral tax reform, provided they are prepared using consistent
methodologies. The levels of MCF estimates will depend on the estimation
methodology, but these levels are not important in deciding directions for
reform. What is important is which tax instruments have high MCFs and
which have low MCFs. In other words the MCFs can loosely be thought of
as ordinal measure. For our tax reform analysis, estimates of the MCF for
different tax instruments in the same country will commonly be prepared us-
ing consistent methodology. That is, with the same numeraire, with changes
in welfare measured using the equivalent variation, and with public spending
consisting only of lump sum transfers. By virtue of Schöb (1994) result, our
estimates indicate priorities for the reform of African tax structures.
3 The Model
Our model is formally set out in Appendix 1. Four goods are consumed in
the economy: leisure (Z ), untaxed (U ), domestic (D), and imports (M ). In-
vestment occupies a large part of the economy in reality, so it needs to be
incorporated somehow, although it serves no role in a static model. This is
achieved in the model by creating an additional good, investment (I ). The
representative consumer derives utility by purchasing investment, which can
be thought of as deriving utility from future consumption. We set prefer-
ences as Cobb-Douglas over investment and all other goods, meaning that
consumers devote a constant proportion of their incomes to each of them.
The representative consumer has endowments of leisure (which may be con-
verted into labour), capital, and foreign exchange, which is used to purchase
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imports from the rest of the world.6
On the production side of the economy, three final goods are produced
in the country: untaxed (U ), domestic (D), and exports (E ). Exports are
not consumed directly. Instead they are used to purchase foreign exchange
(at a constant exchange rate), which is used to purchase imports from the
rest of the world. Firms receive funds from sales of their production and
from investment. These funds are spent on factors of production. Thus the
production sectors are modelled as using factor inputs, to produce jointly a
final good (untaxed, domestic or export) together with investment. Sector
output is divided between the good and investment according to a constant
elasticity of transformation function. By setting the elasticity, denoted τ ,
equal to one (i.e., Cobb-Douglas), a constant proportion of each production
sector’s total income is derived from investment.
The production goods use four factors of production: formal capital (Kf ),
informal capital (Ki), formal labour (Lf ) and informal labour (Li).7 One
consequence of including informal factors is that capital taxation results in a
deadweight loss, even though the total supply of capital is fixed. Labour tax-
ation also induces a deadweight loss as a result of substitution between formal
and informal labour, in addition to the deadweight loss arising from substitu-
tion between labour and leisure. It is assumed that production is competitive,
so that all funds received by firms are paid out to factors. This assumption is
consistent with empirical evidences on return to scale in African industries.8
Constant elasticity of substitution (CES) functions are used in all pro-
duction and utility functions. The structure of these functions is set out in
Figure 1. The first panel is the utility function, where utility (W ) is a Cobb-
Douglas function of leisure, investment, and a consumption good C, and C
is a composite good produced by a CES function of untaxed, domestic, and
6The endowment of foreign exchange represents the trade balance. In Africa, this is
financed by borrowing and foreign aid. In a static model borrowing has no purpose, so
the endowment can be thought of as foreign aid.
7The informal good uses only informal capital and informal labour.
8Tybout (2000) who surveyed the empirical literature on production in developing
countries, reports returns to scale very close to unity in all the industries covered by
the literature (including India, Indonesia and Africa). Regarding Africa he writes: "Us-
ing firm-level African data collected by the Regional Program on Enterprise Development
(RPED), Biggs, Shah, and Srivasava (1995) fit the same estimator to four manufacturing
sectors in Ghana, Kenya, and Zimbabwe. Interestingly, even when the sample is limited
to firms with three to twenty workers, they estimate returns to scale very close to unity."
[...] "when the entire stratified sample is used for each industry (covering the entire size
spectrum), returns to scale are still close to unity in food and textiles/garments, while mild
increasing returns are found in wood products and metal products."
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Figure 1: Utility and Production Functions
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imports. The remaining panels are the production functions for domestic,
export and untaxed. The bottom parts of these diagrams represent the
nested CES functions over the factors of production, with the top levels
representing capital/labour substitution, and the bottom levels representing
formal/informal substitution. The top parts of the diagrams represent the
Cobb-Douglas transformation functions between the final good and invest-
ment. In the base case all the elasticities are set to 1 so that the functions
are Cobb-Douglas. The relevant elasticities, used in robustness testing of the
model, are labelled by sigma and appropriate sub- and super-scripts.
On the public side of the economy taxes are imposed on domestic, exports,
imports, formal capital, and formal labour. There are no untaxed traded
exports or imports. This is not meant to imply that no smuggling occurs in
African countries. Rather, the official figures for trade are based on customs
data, which typically reflects taxed goods. An implication is that the untaxed
good is produced and consumed purely domestically.
Tax revenue received by the Government is transferred lump-sum to con-
sumers. The experiment of increasing a distortionary tax rate and returning
the revenue lump-sum can be interpreted in terms of both ‘differential’ and
‘balanced-budget’ analysis. But as emphasized in section 2, for purposes
of MCF estimates the realism of the modelled public expenditure is not as
important as the fact that a consistent experiment is conducted across tax
instruments.
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3.1 Data
The data are given in Appendix 2. Country-specific data comprise values
of exports, imports and investment as a percentage of GDP, tax revenues
for each of the five taxes, and legal tax rates for domestic goods, capital
and labour. These data were obtained from IMF country report statistical
Annexes.
Data for tax revenue from sales of domestic are derived from tax revenues
from domestic VATs. In the absence of a VAT, general sales tax revenues are
used. Corporate income tax revenues are interpreted as tax revenues from
formal capital. Personal income tax revenues are equated with revenues from
formal labour. Data for tax revenues from exports and imports are taken
directly from the national accounts.9 We ignore classes of tax revenue that
do not fall into any of the five tax revenue classes of the model. For the
countries in our sample, such other taxes represent on average 10% of total
tax revenue. We assume that these other tax revenues are unaffected by
shocks to the model’s five tax rates, implicitly treating them as lump-sum
taxes.
Our model has only a single tax instrument for each good or factor. This
rate is treated as both the average and the marginal tax rate. The inclusion
of an untaxed domestic good and informal factors allows us to assume that
the average tax rates for domestic, formal capital and formal labour can be
equated with the legal tax rates: either the legal tax bill is paid entirely or
it is not paid at all.
For domestic, the legal tax rate used is the standard VAT or sales tax rate
on domestic goods. In countries without a VAT, tax rates on intermediate
goods cascade in the taxed price of final output. In such cases, the tax rate
applied in the model is likely to be an underestimate of the marginal tax rate
on many domestic goods.
Progressive personal income tax schedules provide multiple legal marginal
tax rates for the tax on formal labour. Where the average public sector salary
is known or can be calculated, this salary is treated as a proxy for the average
wage paid to formal labour, and is used to determine the relevant marginal
9The countries of the Southern African Customs Union (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia,
South Africa and Swaziland) share imports tax revenue according to a formula that gives
a reduced share of the revenue to South Africa. Our calibration method is inaccurate to
the extent that the formula differs from the share of regional imports that is consumed by
each country.
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tax rate. If the average public sector salary is not known a marginal rate of
income tax from the middle of the legally specified tax rates is chosen. To
this rate is added the rate of any payroll tax. The standard rate of corporate
income tax is used for the tax on formal capital.
For taxes on exports and imports, there are usually multiple legal tax
rates, and there is no simple method of choosing between them to provide a
single tax rate for the model. Instead we used average tax rates calculated
as tax revenue divided by the tax base. To the extent that informal traded
goods are represented in the official statistics for exports and imports, this
procedure underestimates the average of multiple marginal tax rates.
Finally the data also include labour-output ratios. These labour-output
ratios are, by assumption, common for all countries. They are the averages of
ratios derived from social accounting matrices (SAMs) prepared by IFPRI for
Malawi 1998, South Africa 1999, Tanzania 2001, Zambia 1995, and Zimbabwe
1991. The data are set out in Appendix 2, and the average ratios are: 37%
for untaxed, 43% for domestic and 52% for exports.
3.2 Model Calibration
The economic relationships in the model can be represented by a rectangular
SAM such as Table 2. The entries in the SAM are expressed as percent-
ages of GDP at market value. All rows and columns sum to zero, reflecting
a Walrasian equilibrium in which incomes equal expenditures. In the con-
sumer’s column positive entries are endowments or factor incomes, negative
figures are expenditures on goods, including investment. In the production
columns, positive entries are the receipt of sales revenue or investment, and
negative entries are payments to factors or factor taxes. In the government’s
column, positive figures are tax revenues, the negative figure is the transfer
to consumers. The ‘Foreign’ column represents the purchase of exports and
the sale of imports by the rest of the world, using foreign exchange.
The calibration process is formally described in Appendix 3. It starts with
a standard definition of GDP, the sum of consumption, investment and net
exports: GDP = C+ I+(E−M). The figures for C and I incorporate gov-
ernment consumption and investment. This definition of GDP corresponds
to the format usually given in IMF country reports. In our model the goods
that are consumed (ignoring leisure), can be divided between imports (M)
and non-imports (N), where non-imports comprise domestic and untaxed :
C = N +M . Using the definition of GDP we calculate the amount of non-
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Table 2: SAM for Guinea-Bissau 2001
Consumer Untaxed Domestic Exports Imports Foreign Govt
Untaxed -48.20 48.20
Domestic -5.67 4.93 0.74
Exports 24.60 -27.21 2.61
Imports -57.71 53.41 4.30
Investment -18.92 11.73 1.20 5.99
Foreign Exchange 26.20 -53.40 27.20
Formal Capital 2.36 -0.39 -1.97
Informal Capital 48.36 -28.85 -2.93 -16.58
Formal Labour 9.45 -1.58 -7.87
Informal Labour 34.61 -31.08 -0.92 -2.61
Capital Taxes -0.15 -0.77 0.92
Labour Taxes -0.16 -0.79 0.95
Transfers 9.51 -9.51
Figures represent a percentage of GDP at market value. Positive figures are revenues
received by the column from the row. Negative figures are payments made by the column
to the row. Figures in bold are taken directly from national accounts, all others are
calculated using the calibration process.
imports consumed as N = GDP − I − E. Consumption of non-imports
is equal to production of non-imports. Production of domestic, the taxed
non-imported good in the model, is calculated by dividing VAT revenue by
the tax rate, giving the tax base: D = RD
TD
. Consumer expenditure on the
untaxed good (equal to the value of production) is thus the residual of non-
imports: U = N − (1 + TD)×D. This provides a first measure of the size of
the informal economy in countries where such estimate does not exist.
The calibration process can be illustrated with data from Guinea-Bissau.
All quantities in the SAM of Table 2 can be derived from the data described
in section 3.1. The value of investment, as a percentage of GDP at market
prices, available directly from the national accounts, is: I = 18.9. The
producer value of exports is derived by subtracting export tax revenue from
the market value of exports: E = 27.21−2.61 = 24.6. The producer value of
domestic is determined by dividing tax revenue for domestic goods (0.74%
of GDP) by the standard sales tax rate (15%): D = 0.74
0.15
= 4.93. The
value of untaxed is then the residual of GDP less investment and the taxed
value of domestic and exports, all expressed as a percentage of GDP: U =
100 − (D + 0.74) − (E + 2.61) − I = 48.20. For estimates of the size of the
informal economy in all the countries see Table 11 in the Appendix.
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Total funds received by the firms in a sector is the sum of sales and invest-
ment. For example, firms producing exports receive E+ IE = 24.60+5.99 =
30.59. Since production is assumed to be competitive, all funds received by
firms are paid out to factors. Capital and labour requirements for production
are determined using the average labour-output ratios of Appendix 2. Thus,
for example, with a labour-output ratio of 0.37 for exports, total capital used
to produce exports is KE = (1 − 0.37) × (E + IE) = 18.55. Since untaxed
uses only informal capital and informal labour, this procedure is all that is
required to determine the allocation of capital and labour to untaxed.
For domestic and exports, factor usage must be divided between formal
and informal factors. The amounts of formal capital and labour are deter-
mined by dividing tax receipts by the legal tax rate. With a 39% corporations
tax, total formal capital is Kf = RK
TK
= 0.92
0.39
= 2.36. Applying a personal in-
come tax rate of 10% implies total formal labour of Lf = 0.945
0.1
= 9.45. These
amounts are divided between domestic and exports in proportion to output.
For example, formal capital in exports isKfE = K
f× E
E+D
= 2.36× 24.60
24.60+4.93
=
1.97. Informal capital and labour are then the residuals of total capital and
labour for each industry less formal capital and labour and the taxes paid
on these factors. For example informal capital used to produce exports is
KiE = KE −KfE × (1 + tK) = 18.55− 1.97× (1 + 0.39) = 16.58.
The SAM of Table 2 does not show leisure. The quantity of leisure is
determined by the representative consumer’s endowment of time less the sum
of formal and informal labour. Since the utility function is Cobb-Douglas,
the elasticity of labour supply is η = T−L
L
where T is the time endowment and
L is total labour supply. The value of L is fixed by the data – in the case of
Guinea-Bissau L = Li+Lf = 9.45+34.61 = 44.06. The calibration approach
is to choose a value for the labour supply elasticity, η, which then fixes the
value of T . There appear to be very few published estimates of the elasticity
of labour supply in developing countries. For rich countries, estimates of the
elasticity of labour supply are close to zero, when estimated for those who are
employed. Nevertheless at the extensive margin, the decision whether or not
to take a job, the elasticity of labour supply is positive. For our developing
countries, we felt that some small responsiveness of labour supply to changes
in taxation was appropriate, and thus chose an elasticity of η = 0.05, implying
that T = 1.05× L = 46.263.
National accounts figures represent values: price × quantity. Follow-
ing the Harberger convention, units of aggregate goods are chosen such that
quantities equal values. This implies that for untaxed goods or factors, bench-
mark prices are equal to one. For taxed goods and factors, we choose quantity
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units such that either the net of tax price or the gross of tax price is equal
to one at the benchmark equilibrium. Specification of the tax rates allows
calculation of the missing prices.
With all benchmark prices and quantities determined, calibration fin-
ishes with the selection of elasticities for the CES utility and production
functions. Our base case uses unitary elasticities: constant returns to scale
Cobb-Douglas functions. This appears to be reasonable for the elasticity of
demand for imports (see Senhadji (1998)). But we do not have evidence on
the empirical magnitude of other necessary elasticities. Faced with a data
vacuum we preferred a simple functional specification, and performed sensi-
tivity checks by changing elasticities. Using the quantities in the SAM, and
the assumed elasticities, the production and utility functions are calibrated.
The same methodology is applied for all 38 African countries.
3.3 Discussion
While this account of the calibration process is straight-forward, it glosses
over several problems with the calibration of informal sectors. It is likely
that these problems affect all countries to some degree, but the issue is par-
ticularly acute in eight countries where, using the procedure described above,
the calibrated values of sections of the informal economy are negative. The
untaxed good is negative in Equatorial Guinea (-74% of GDP), Gabon (-2
%), Mauritania (-3%), Namibia (-22%), and Swaziland (-3%). In addition,
the calibration process gives negative values for informal labour used to pro-
duce domestic and exports in Cape Verde (-5%), South Africa (-13%) and
Zimbabwe (-13%) (see Table 11 in the Appendix).
The first problem is a general question about the reliability of GDP
data in small developing economies. Statisticians dealing with developing
economies make efforts to incorporate the informal economy, but to the ex-
tent that some informal activities escape the measure of GDP, our calibrated
informal sectors are too small. Data reliability may affect results for all
countries, but it does not give rise to negative calibrated values for untaxed
goods.
The second problem arises in countries with considerable re-exportation
of imports. The problem can be seen when we consider the definition GDP =
C + I + (E −M). Suppose that initially there are no re-exports, and then
an additional $100 of goods is imported and immediately re-exported with-
out any value-added. The GDP figure, which is the sum of value-added, is
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unchanged. But the increase in measured exports reduces our measure of
non-imports by $100, since N = GDP − I − E. With the size of domestic
calibrated independently, any re-export of goods results in a corresponding
diminution of the untaxed sector: U = N−D. With sufficient re-exportation,
the untaxed sector becomes negative. An extreme case is Equatorial Guinea,
where exports constitute 106% of GDP. For most countries it seems likely
that re-exports constitute a sufficiently small part of total exports that the
calibration method is not seriously compromised. Unfortunately we did not
have the necessary data to eliminate the problem by separating total exports
between those of domestic origin and those of foreign origin.
The final problem in calibrating untaxed arises from the method of cal-
culating domestic, by dividing sales tax revenue by the tax rate. Where the
sales tax is a VAT, with full rebating of tax paid on inputs and a single rate,
the calibration method probably gives a fairly accurate measure of the do-
mestic tax base. But if sales taxes cascade, without rebates for taxes paid on
inputs, the effective marginal tax rate can be much higher than the standard
sales tax rate. In such cases, the tax rate used for calibration purposes is
too low, so the estimated domestic tax base is too large. Then, noting that
U = N −D, when the estimated size of D is too large, the estimated size of
the untaxed sector is too small. The fact that Namibia and Swaziland do not
have VATs may help to understand the small calibrated values of their un-
taxed sectors. The further a country’s sales tax system departs from a ‘pure’
VAT (a single tax rate, no exemptions, and full refunds for taxed inputs),
the less accurate is the calibration methodology for identifying the domestic
tax base.
Similar issues arise in calibrating informal factor supplies. If the assumed
labour-output ratios are not sufficiently large, the total labour supply is less
than the calibrated value of formal labour. If the personal income tax rate
used for calibration is too small, the calibrated value of formal labour is too
large. In principle the same problems could arise in calibrating informal
capital, but in practice the problem did not arise.
Our solution is pragmatic. The basic calibration methodology suggests
‘small’ values for the untaxed good and informal labour used to produce
taxed goods. At the same time, strictly positive values are required for the
experiments conducted in section 5.1. For the five countries with negative
untaxed, we set the value of untaxed at 1% of GDP.10 For the three countries
10For these countries, the calibrated market value of the three produced goods thus
exceeds 100% of GDP.
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with negative informal labour requirements in exports and domestic, we ad-
justed the labour-output ratio to ensure that informal labour constituted 1%
of formal labour. It should be emphasized that a process of adjustment of the
values in the SAM is typical in the development of CGEs: real-world data
rarely match the internal consistency requirements of a SAM. Nevertheless,
our results should be interpreted with particular caution for the ‘problem’
countries, and for all countries lacking VATs (these are reported in the data
appendix).
4 Results
We calculated the MCFs associated with six different shocks to tax rates.
In the first five experiments we increased each tax rate individually by 1%
of the existing tax rate.11 In the sixth experiment we increased all five tax
rates simultaneously by 1%. In each case the additional tax revenue, ∆R,
was redistributed to consumers as a lump sum transfer. The new equilibrium
was established using a computable general equilibrium model written using
GAMS MPSGE. The welfare change induced by the combined tax and spend
experiment was measured in terms of the numeraire using the equivalent
variation, denoted EV .12 The MCF of the experiment was calculated as
MCF =
EV
∆R
. (2)
4.1 Base Case Estimates
The resulting MCF estimates are presented in Table 3. The estimates provide
a basic blueprint for tax reform in each country. For any pair of tax instru-
ments, the same total revenue could be achieved for lower deadweight loss
by lowering tax rates associated with a high MCF and increasing low-MCF
tax rates.
11Where the tax rate was 0% we increased it to 1%.
12In theoretical papers on the MCF changes in utility are converted to a monetary
measure by dividing by the marginal utility of income. When the utility function is
linearly homogeneous (as is the case in our model) the equivalent variation gives the same
measure of welfare change. GAMS measures the change in welfare, ∆WG, after the tax
revenues has been redistributed lump sum to the representative consumer. Since taxation
is distorting in general ∆WG is negative. In order to get the value express in (2) we
compute EV = ∆R−∆WG.
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Table 3: MCF Estimates
Country Domestic Exports Imports Capital Labour All
Benin 1.11 1.28 1.15 1.68 1.60 1.23
Botswana 1.03 1.02 1.03 1.07 1.05 1.05
Burkina Faso 1.15 -10.82 1.18 1.55 1.55 1.25
Burundi 1.10 0.76 1.10 1.66 1.88 1.22
Cameroon 1.10 1.08 1.07 1.53 1.27 1.14
Cape Verde 1.11 1.96 1.21 1.72 1.79 1.37
Central African Rep. 1.14 1.31 1.14 1.62 1.71 1.23
Chad 1.19 1.26 1.09 1.87 2.01 1.33
Dem. Rep. of Congo 1.01 1.02 1.01 1.43 1.38 1.10
Côte d’Ivoire 1.05 1.06 1.06 1.43 1.36 1.12
Eq. Guinea 1.05 1.00 1.00 1.24 1.10 1.13
Eritrea 1.02 0.63 1.03 1.20 1.14 1.09
Ethiopia 1.13 3.14 1.23 1.75 1.60 1.31
Gabon 1.03 1.02 1.05 1.39 1.35 1.10
Gambia 0.98 1.12 1.08 1.45 1.21 1.12
Ghana 1.03 1.17 1.10 1.50 1.26 1.17
Guinea 1.11 1.01 1.00 1.49 1.43 1.12
Guinea-Bissau 1.09 1.35 1.13 2.03 1.49 1.26
Kenya 1.02 1.20 1.06 1.30 1.11 1.08
Madagascar 1.13 1.16 1.11 1.58 1.32 1.17
Malawi 1.20 1.04 1.01 1.39 1.43 1.23
Mali 1.11 1.27 1.14 1.66 1.64 1.21
Mauritania 1.08 0.97 0.98 1.24 1.22 1.10
Mozambique 1.04 1.17 1.07 1.60 1.22 1.11
Namibia 0.97 1.10 1.06 1.39 1.09 1.10
Niger 1.17 1.29 1.15 1.90 1.80 1.24
Nigeria 0.99 1.02 1.02 1.30 1.19 1.08
Rwanda 1.14 -92.74 1.14 1.87 1.80 1.28
São Tomé 1.27 1.21 1.07 1.54 1.31 1.15
Senegal 1.07 1.27 1.13 1.55 1.80 1.19
South Africa 1.09 1.02 1.00 1.29 1.11 1.12
Sudan 1.09 1.92 1.23 1.87 1.57 1.26
Swaziland 1.11 1.01 1.01 1.34 1.30 1.09
Tanzania 1.17 1.59 1.20 1.76 1.73 1.27
Togo 1.06 1.11 1.07 1.40 1.50 1.12
Uganda 1.10 0.82 0.97 1.40 1.30 1.11
Zambia 1.06 1.09 1.03 1.44 1.14 1.09
Zimbabwe 1.08 1.10 1.03 1.28 1.10 1.11
Average 1.09 -1.58 1.08 1.52 1.42 1.17
Max 1.27 3.14 1.23 2.03 2.01 1.37
Min 0.97 -92.74 0.97 1.07 1.05 1.05
Std. Dev. 0.06 15.32 0.07 0.22 0.26 0.08
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On average, the MCF associated with a marginal increase in all five tax
rates is 1.17, indicating a required rate of return of 17% for African public
projects. Among individual tax instruments, on average the lowest MCFs
are associated with taxes on the two taxed consumption goods (domestic and
imports), and the highest MCFs are associated with the two taxed factors
(formal capital and formal labour). The exports MCFs exhibit the greatest
variation.
The high variance of exports MCFs requires comment. Much of the vari-
ation comes from two countries: Burkina Faso and Rwanda. The exports
MCFs in these two countries are negative because the tax shock reduces
tax revenue. The high absolute values occur because the exports tax rate
shock induces a marginal change in total tax revenue that is close to zero.13
Excluding these two countries, the remaining countries can be divided into
two groups. There are 16 countries with zero exports taxes (see the data
in Appendix 7), that as a group have a low average exports MCF of 1.07.
The remaining 20 countries have positive exports taxes, and have an average
exports MCF of 1.32. The relatively high MCF associated with positive ex-
ports taxes can be understood by noting that exports is effectively an input
into imports, so that distortions introduced in the market for exports amplify
distortions in the market for imports.
The general equilibrium interactions between tax instruments are illus-
trated in Figure 2 for the case of Guinea-Bissau. MCFs for different tax
instruments are plotted as a function of the import tariff TM . It shows that
relying on partial equilibrium measures (i.e., focusing only on the import
market) to compute a single MCF would be misleading. The diagram pro-
vides various insights into the interactions within the system.
• The imports MCF increases with the import tariff TM .
• The MCFs for exports, capital and labour are greater than the imports
and domestic MCFs, and they increase at a faster rate than the imports
MCF. Exports, capital and labour are inputs into the production of the
taxed consumption goods, imports and domestic, that enter directly
into the consumer’s welfare function. Increases in taxation of these
inputs causes increased distortion of the taxed prices of the outputs, in
addition to substitution of informal factors for formal factors.
13Although not apparent in the reported results, the exports tax shock also reduces total
tax revenue in Burundi and Eritrea. In these countries, which have zero exports tax rates,
the marginal reduction in tax revenue is associated with a positive exports MCF, because
the marginal welfare change is positive.
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Figure 2: MCFs in Guinea-Bissau as a Function of the Import Tariff
• The domestic MCF decreases as TM increases. When TM ≥ 34% the
domestic MCF is less than one, indicating that marginally increas-
ing the domestic tax helps to correct the distortions induced by high
import tariffs, thereby increasing welfare. Domestic and imports are
substitutes in consumption, so as import tariffs increase, consumption
of domestic increases, helping to offset the effect of existing domestic
taxation.
• Reflecting the conflicting effects of the individual taxes, the MCF ob-
tained by simultaneously varying all tax rates decreases for values of
TM < 4% and increases for TM > 4%. One implication is that this
measure of the MCF does not necessarily increase with total tax rev-
enue. The illustrated values of TM are on the ‘good’ side of the Laffer
curve: total revenue is increasing in TM .
The diagram also illustrates that over wide ranges of the import tariff rate
the ordering of MCFs for individual taxes is unchanged. The next section
explores this robustness result further.
19
4.2 Robustness of Results
Our results are dependent on the specified elasticity parameters. We exper-
imented with alternative elasticities to see the effect on our estimates. The
notation for the relevant elasticities is set out in Figure 1. In testing differ-
ent elasticities we maintained the following values equal to one: σW , τD, τE,
and τU . This ensures that the representative consumer invests a constant
proportion of income, and that each production process receives a constant
proportion of its total funds from investment.
We tested several combinations of elasticities, and the results are set out
in Table 4. For each experiment, any unmentioned elasticity is equal to 1.
The first five experiments increase elasticities. The first experiment increases
the consumer’s elasticity of substitution between consumption goods. The
second increases the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour in
all goods. The third increases the elasticity of substitution between consump-
tion goods and between capital and labour. The fourth increases substitution
between formal and informal factors. The fifth increases substitution between
formal and informal labour, but leaves unchanged the degree of substitution
between formal and informal capital. The final five experiments perform
corresponding reductions in the elasticities of substitution.
Changing elasticities had the expected effect on the magnitude of our
MCF estimates: higher substitutability results in higher MCFs. The MCF
associated with a simultaneous shock of all five taxes, MCF (All), varied
between 1.11 and 1.32. MCF (All) is more sensitive to variation in the
consumer’s elasticity of substitution between consumption goods than the
producers’ elasticity of substitution between capital and labour. On the pro-
duction side, MCF estimates are more sensitive to changes in the elasticity of
substitution between between formal and informal factors than the elasticity
of substitution between capital and labour. It is clearly important to have a
good estimate of the relevant elasticities if MCF estimates are to be used for
cost-benefit analysis.
But for partial revenue-neutral tax reform, it is the ordering of MCF
estimates that is important, not their magnitudes. For such reform, the aim
is to compare two tax instruments, increase the tax rate on the low MCF
tax, and decrease the tax rate on the high MCF tax. Table 4 reports the
number of countries in which the ordering of MCFs is robust to changes
in elasticities. Three measures of robustness are used. The first measure
supposes that reform is concentrated on the most extreme MCFs. The two
tax instruments with the highest and lowest MCFs are identified. If these
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Table 4: Sensitivity Testing
Experiment D E M K L All (1) (2) (3)
σC = 2 1.19 1.88 1.17 1.93 1.89 1.31 29 25 35
σD = σE = σU = 2 1.09 -0.26 1.08 1.50 1.45 1.17 33 33 38
σC = σD = σE = σU = 2 1.19 2.02 1.18 1.93 1.98 1.32 29 25 36
σKD = σ
L
D = σ
K
E = σ
L
E = 2 1.09 -1.58 1.08 2.53 1.89 1.24 35 34 37
σLD = σ
L
E = 2 1.09 -1.58 1.08 1.52 1.89 1.19 22 20 37
σC = 0.5 1.05 1.15 1.05 1.40 1.29 1.11 35 32 35
σD = σE = σU = 0.5 1.09 1.13 1.08 1.52 1.39 1.17 36 34 37
σC = σD = σE = σU = 0.5 1.05 1.14 1.04 1.41 1.28 1.11 34 32 35
σKD = σ
L
D = σ
K
E = σ
L
E = 0.5 1.09 -1.58 1.08 1.29 1.28 1.14 31 28 37
σLD = σ
L
E = 0.5 1.09 -1.58 1.08 1.52 1.28 1.16 31 27 38
Columns D, E, M, K, L, and All report average MCFs for the 38 countries. Columns (1),
(2) and (3) indicate the number of countries that are ‘close’ to the base case estimates
in the sense of giving the same recommendations for tax reform. In column (1) the tax
instruments found to have the highest and lowest MCFs are the same as in the base case.
In column (2) all five individual MCFs are ranked in the same order as in the base case.
In column (3) at most one pairwise comparison of MCFs gives a different recommendation
from the base case estimates.
two instruments are the same as in the base case, the ordering is considered
robust. Among the five tax instruments there are ten pairwise comparisons
that are possible, identifying for each pair the high and low MCF instruments.
The second measure of robustness requires that all ten such comparisons
report the same pairwise ordering. This implies that all five instruments
follow the same order as in the base case. The third measure of robustness
permits just one pairwise comparison to give a different ordering from the
base case. On the basis of the first measure the ordering of MCF estimates
was robust to variations in elasticities in a minimum of 22 out of 38 countries.
On the basis of the third measure it is 35 out of 38 countries. That is, we
can be reasonably confident of the recommendations for tax reform that are
implied by our base case estimates.
5 Tax Reform in Africa
Since on average the lowest MCFs are associated with the two taxed consump-
tion goods (domestic and imports), and the highest MCFs are associated with
the two taxed factors (formal capital and formal labour), the dead-weight loss
of taxation could be lowered by increasing goods taxation and decreasing
factor taxation. However this result is partial because it overlooks the pos-
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sibility to conduct structural reforms to enlarge the taxation base. Analysis
of African tax systems quickly confronts the significance of informal sectors.
Excluding countries in which our basic calibration method gave a negative
untaxed good, the value of untaxed production represents on average 30%
of GDP, with a maximum of 61% in Niger. Adding in the value of untaxed
factors used to produce domestic and exports, the average informal economy
in these countries represents 69% of GDP, with a maximum of 90% in the
Democratic Republic of Congo (see Table 11 in the Appendix).
In this section we examine the impact of the informal economy on the
MCF in the formal economy, and then measure MCFs of potential taxes in dif-
ferent parts of the informal economy, ignoring any administrative costs. We
then examine how the presence of administrative costs affects our estimates
for taxes in the formal economy, and we consider the level of administrative
costs that could be justified to impose taxes in the informal economy.
5.1 The Informal Economy
At the heart of the dead-weight loss of taxation is the substitution effect. It
is presumably higher when it is easier to escape taxation. This suggests that
economies with large informal sectors are likely to have high MCFs. Figure
3 plots our base case estimates of MCF (All) against the calibrated value of
untaxed, suggesting the strength of this intuition. A simple regression of our
38 estimates of MCF (All) on untaxed and a constant has an adjusted R2 of
0.75. Some of the unexplained variation in MCF values in the diagram is due
to variation in tax structures. To capture this in a simple way, we created
a variable, structure, which measured the proportion of exports and factor
tax revenue in total tax revenue (using the same figures used for calibration
of the model). Adding this variable to the regression we obtained:
MCF (All) = 1.024
(0.024)
+ 0.402
(0.036)
Untaxed+ 0.116
(0.049)
Structure
The adjusted R2 of this regression is 0.78. Standard errors are reported in
brackets, with the coefficients on the constant and untaxed significant at 1%
and the coefficient on structure significant at 2.5%. In contrast a regression of
MCF (All) on just structure and a constant gives no statistically significant
results. These results suggest that, at least for the African countries we have
studied, the magnitude of an economy’s average MCF is dominated by the
size of the informal economy, with the tax structure playing only a relatively
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Figure 3: MCF(All) as a Function of the Value of the Untaxed Good
small role.
Intuitively, goods that are more lightly taxed than goods in the rest of the
economy will tend to have low MCFs, since increasing their taxes will shift
relative prices towards the undistorted ratios. Thus, taxes imposed on parts
of the informal economy should have very low MCFs. We confirmed this
intuition by imposing hypothetical taxes on informal parts of the economy
in our model. We supposed it was possible to impose a tax in these sectors,
and marginally increased the tax from an initial rate of zero. We calculated
MCFs when 1% taxes were imposed on: production of the untaxed good (U);
informal capital used anywhere in the economy (Ki); informal capital used
to produce domestic or export goods (KiDE); informal labour used anywhere
in the economy (Li); and informal labour used to produce domestic or ex-
port goods (LiDE). We distinguished between taxing a factor wherever it
is used and taxing a factor when it is used to produce domestic or export
goods because the latter seems more plausible. It seems more likely that
the administration will be able to tax a firm’s accounting profits (returns to
capital) and labour inputs in cases where the firm’s output is already taxed.
The results of these experiments are reported in Table 5.
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Table 5: MCFs in the Informal Sector
Country U Ki KiDE L
i LiDE
Benin 0.87 0.95 1.07 0.94 1.12
Botswana 0.86 0.90 0.91 0.92 0.95
Burkina Faso 0.89 0.94 1.21 0.92 1.19
Burundi 0.83 0.95 1.05 0.87 0.99
Cameroon 0.89 0.97 1.02 0.97 1.06
Cape Verde 0.81 0.79 1.22 0.80 1.26
Central African Republic 0.92 0.98 1.15 0.97 1.16
Chad 0.93 0.97 1.12 0.97 1.15
Democratic Republic of Congo 0.97 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.00
Côte d’Ivoire 0.83 0.95 0.98 0.95 1.00
Equatorial Guinea 0.98 0.98 0.98 1.00 1.00
Eritrea 0.87 0.88 0.92 0.93 0.99
Ethiopia 0.87 0.89 1.17 0.92 1.21
Gabon 0.85 0.97 0.97 0.99 0.99
Gambia 0.84 0.95 0.99 0.93 1.01
Ghana 0.87 0.95 1.03 0.92 1.04
Guinea 0.93 1.00 1.05 0.98 1.06
Guinea-Bissau 0.89 0.97 1.22 0.92 1.26
Kenya 0.81 0.92 0.94 0.87 0.93
Madagascar 0.91 0.97 1.07 0.96 1.11
Malawi 0.96 0.98 1.03 0.98 1.05
Mali 0.89 0.96 1.10 0.96 1.15
Mauritania 0.89 0.96 0.97 0.94 0.95
Mozambique 0.86 0.98 1.02 0.95 1.03
Namibia 0.79 0.92 0.92 0.85 0.86
Niger 0.94 0.98 1.16 0.98 1.19
Nigeria 0.92 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.97
Rwanda 0.90 0.94 1.14 0.96 1.18
São Tomé 0.84 0.95 1.08 0.80 1.14
Senegal 0.83 0.95 1.03 0.93 1.05
South Africa 0.78 0.89 0.92 0.71 0.77
Sudan 0.95 0.97 1.18 1.00 1.21
Swaziland 0.78 0.96 0.96 0.89 0.89
Tanzania 0.91 0.98 1.21 0.93 1.21
Togo 0.89 0.96 1.02 0.98 1.05
Uganda 0.92 0.98 1.03 0.98 1.05
Zambia 0.82 0.97 1.00 0.81 0.92
Zimbabwe 0.76 0.88 0.91 0.69 0.76
Average 0.87 0.95 1.05 0.92 1.05
Max 0.98 1.00 1.22 1.00 1.26
Min 0.76 0.79 0.91 0.69 0.76
Std. Dev. 0.06 0.04 0.09 0.07 0.12
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In all countries the MCF of a tax on the untaxed good is less than 1.
The negative welfare shock suffered by households (before the revenue is re-
turned lump-sum) is smaller than the increase in government revenue. Once
lump-sum redistribution of the revenue occurs, households are better off than
before the tax shock. Increasing taxes in the informal sector helps to coun-
teract existing taxes in other sectors, moving relative prices towards their
undistorted levels.
When taxation of informal factors is restricted to inputs to domestic
and export goods, the MCF is higher than when informal factors are taxed
wherever they are used: MCF (KiDE) > MCF (Ki) and MCF (LiDE) >
MCF (Li). Two effects operate. Taxing an untaxed factor helps to restore
prices to their undistorted levels, tending to lower the MCF. When the un-
taxed factors are inputs to taxed goods, the relative costs of these goods rise,
the distortion associated with goods taxation increases and the MCF tends
to be higher. The second of these effects is relatively stronger when the tax
shock is concentrated on inputs to domestic and export goods.
Ignoring distributional issues, on average among the fictional tax instru-
ments for taxing the informal sectors, the best way of raising money is by
increasing taxes on untaxed goods. The averageMCF (U) is 0.87, lower than
the average MCF elsewhere in the informal economy. But governments may
hesitate to increase taxes of the informal sector if they care about distribu-
tional issues and poor households are concentrated in production of untaxed
goods or they consume a lot of untaxed goods. When distributional issues
are considered, a promising part of the informal economy is informal capital
used to produce taxed goods: averageMCF (KiDE) is 1.05. That is, imposing
taxes on companies that produce taxed goods but do not pay company tax
generally offers a lower cost of public funds than increasing existing taxes
elsewhere in the formal economy. In many cases such companies have legal
tax exemptions, which can be removed with low administrative expense.14
Removing such exemptions has the potential for a low marginal cost of taxa-
tion, without obvious major effects on the poorest households. An alternative
14In a survey of 197 businesses in Cameroon, Gauthier & Gersovitz (1997) report that 4
were legally exempt from sales tax, while 30 were legally exempt from the business profits
tax. In Gauthier & Reinikka (2001) a similar survey of 158 businesses in Uganda reports
17 exemptions from sales tax and 41 exemptions from the corporate income tax. Both
studies found that exemptions tended to be granted to large firms, while smaller firms were
more likely to evade tax illegally. Legal tax exemptions may be the result of corruption.
Fjeldstad (2002) reports that in the mid 1990s senior Tanzanian officials accepted bribes
in return for tax exemptions: “within the Ministry of Finance, the Revenue Department
went under the nickname of the ‘Tax Exemption Department.’ ”
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means of increasing capital taxation may be to encourage firms to move from
the informal to the formal sector by lowering license fees and time costs for
establishing formal enterprises (see Auriol & Warlters (2005)).
5.2 Costs of Tax Administration
The preceding section shows that large informal sector are associated with in-
efficiency in taxation. If governments were able to enlarge their tax base, they
could simultaneously increase tax collection and decrease the dead weight loss
of taxation. One may wonder why governments in developing countries do
not enlarge their taxation base. One plausible explanation is because of high
administration costs. There is indeed evidence of a relatively high cost of
tax administration in Africa. Table 6 provides an international comparison
of administrative costs, measured by dividing the expenses of tax collection
agencies by the revenue collected. The average for rich countries is 1.36%,
1.88% for Latin American countries, and 2.35% for African countries.15
A taxpayer paying a dollar of taxes suffers the same loss of utility regard-
less of whether the administration has paid 2 cents or 50 cents to enforce the
collection. Further, the administration costs are not lost to society. They are
paid to civil servants and other providers of goods and services. Thus, tax
administration costs do not alter ∆W in our MCF formula (1).16 Adminis-
tration costs do, however, alter ∆R, by reducing the net revenue available
for government spending. If we suppose that administration costs consti-
tute µ% of tax revenue collected, a tax shock that changes gross revenue by
∆R changes net revenue by ∆R(1−µ)%. Incorporating administrative costs
in our MCF estimates is thus a simple matter of multiplying our existing
estimates by 1
1−µ .
Table 6 indicates that on average µ = 2.35% in Africa. On this evidence,
our base case results should be multiplied by 1.024. Incorporating admin-
istration costs increases the average MCF (All) for African countries from
1.17 to 1.20. Although Africa has more costly tax administrations than other
regions, this alone is unlikely to result in substantially higher marginal costs
of public funds.
15Not all of the tax agencies represented in these figures collect all types of taxes. Since
the costs of collection vary by tax type, this may give a distorted impression of the efficiency
of some agencies.
16We treat as negligibly small the marginal change in consumer surplus forgone on
goods that could have been produced using the factors of production involved in tax
administration.
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Table 6: Tax Administration Costs
Country Year(s) Cost/Collections
Australia 2001-2002 1.2%
Canada 2001-2002 2.3%
New Zealand 2001-2002 1.2%
UK 2001-2002 1.6%
US 2002 0.5%
Guatemala 1999-2001 1.9%
Mexico 1995, 1997-98 1.7%
Peru 1996-1998 1.9%
Venezuela 1995-1998 2.0%
Ghana 1993 2.8%
Kenya 1995-2000 1.2%
Namibia 2001-2002 1.3%
South Africa 1998-2001 1.1%
Tanzania 1996-1997 3.0%
Uganda 1991-2000 3.6%
The cost/collections ratio reports the annual cost of tax collection agencies divided by
the amount of money collected. For data sources, see Appendix 7.
One explanation for the failure to tax the informal sector may be large
administrative costs associated with taxing the first marginal unit of the tax
base. We do not have data on the magnitude of administrative costs for the
informal sector (µi). However, noting that in an optimized tax system the
MCF of all tax instruments would be equal, we can calculate the µi that
would equate the MCF of a tax in the informal sector, MCF i, with the base
case MCF (All) when administrative costs are considered, according to the
following formula:
µi = 1− MCF
i(1− µ)
MCF (All)
(3)
Using µ=0.0235, we calculated the threshold administrative costs, µi for
the parts of the informal economy discussed in section 5.1. Table 7 reports
the averages across our sample of countries.
On average, increased efforts to enforce taxes on the untaxed good would
be justified up to the point where administrative costs consume 27% of the
revenue collected. This is more than 10 times the actual average cost of
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Table 7: Administrative Cost Thresholds
U Ki KiDE L
i LiDE
0.27 0.21 0.13 0.23 0.12
collection. Taxing currently untaxed profits of businesses that produce taxed
goods would be justified with administrative costs of 13%. These figures are
far from negligible. They suggest that large benefits can be gained from a
reform of the tax system. However in some cases they might not be large
enough, at least in the short run, to cover the fixed cost of the reform. For
example, there are high sunk costs associated with identifying taxpayers. In
practice not only may administrative costs be higher for taxes on the informal
sector than for taxes in other sectors, but the administrative cost function
may exhibit non-convexity.
6 MCF Dispersion and Tax System Inefficiency
When only distorting taxes are available, the MCFs of optimal taxes are all
equal. This suggests that MCF dispersion could be used as a measure of
tax system inefficiency. We explore the relevance of this intuition in what
follows. We leave aside informal sector tax reform. We focus on actual taxes.
To assess the potential benefits of tax reform, we derived optimal taxes to
achieve each country’s existing revenue. We iteratively reduced high MCF
taxes and increased low MCF taxes until MCFs were equalized or remaining
high MCF taxes had zero rates. The resulting tax structure involves zero
taxes on exports, capital and labour. The only taxes are on the taxed goods
that are consumed: domestic and imports. This is an illustration of the
Diamond & Mirrlees (1971) production efficiency result. We calculated the
welfare gain from moving to optimal taxes (subject to the limited set of
distorting tax instruments), and calculated the resulting MCFs of the taxes
on domestic and imports. For comparison, we also measured the welfare
gain from entirely removing all distorting taxes, or equivalently, only using
lump-sum taxation.
The results are reported in Table 8. Countries are listed in order of the
potential welfare gains from moving to optimal taxes to achieve the same
tax revenue using only distorting taxes. The column ‘∆W (optimal)’ reports
these welfare gains in percentage terms, where the change in welfare is mea-
sured using the equivalent variation. The average potential welfare gain is
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Table 8: Measures of Tax System Inefficiency (% of GDP)
∆W ∆W Std. Dev MCF Revenue
Country (optimal) (zero taxes) MCFs (optimal)
Botswana 0.02 0.38 0.02 1.05 12.50
Eq. Guinea 0.11 0.11 0.10 1.00 3.42
Dem. Rep. Congo 0.12 0.13 0.21 1.01 2.57
Guinea 0.19 0.39 0.23 1.06 6.96
Madagascar 0.25 0.73 0.20 1.11 9.40
Uganda 0.26 0.41 0.24 1.04 8.88
Nigeria 0.28 0.33 0.13 1.01 6.45
Sudan 0.28 0.59 0.37 1.14 5.23
Malawi 0.29 0.33 0.19 1.03 3.78
Mozambique 0.29 0.50 0.22 1.05 11.18
Eritrea 0.29 0.38 0.22 1.02 13.96
Niger 0.30 0.69 0.36 1.14 6.69
Cameroon 0.33 0.75 0.20 1.08 10.43
Togo 0.34 0.66 0.21 1.06 11.30
Gabon 0.36 0.75 0.19 1.06 10.20
Mauritania 0.36 0.42 0.13 1.01 10.52
C.A.R. 0.37 0.72 0.27 1.11 7.75
Zambia 0.38 0.72 0.17 1.05 17.30
Tanzania 0.41 1.05 0.28 1.16 9.40
São Tomé 0.43 0.70 0.17 1.05 15.18
Kenya 0.43 0.76 0.11 1.04 19.48
Mali 0.43 0.96 0.27 1.12 11.19
Gambia 0.44 0.88 0.18 1.06 16.57
Zimbabwe 0.45 1.05 0.10 1.06 23.34
Burkina Faso 0.47 0.93 5.45 1.12 10.00
Ghana 0.48 0.79 0.18 1.06 11.86
South Africa 0.50 1.09 0.11 1.06 21.17
Côte d’Ivoire 0.52 0.98 0.19 1.06 15.74
Guinea-Bissau 0.56 0.78 0.38 1.07 9.51
Chad 0.58 0.78 0.42 1.08 6.22
Benin 0.59 1.27 0.26 1.12 12.90
Swaziland 0.60 0.86 0.15 1.03 22.69
Rwanda 0.63 1.03 42.14 1.11 9.66
Namibia 0.72 0.96 0.16 1.03 25.19
Ethiopia 0.75 1.47 0.81 1.14 13.28
Senegal 0.76 1.49 0.31 1.10 17.23
Cape Verde 1.12 1.79 0.38 1.12 18.32
Burundi 1.13 1.74 0.46 1.08 18.04
Average 0.44 0.80 1.48 1.07 12.25
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worth 0.44% of GDP in money terms. This is not negligible in light of the
low level of tax collection in African countries. For instance Chad suffers a
dead-weight loss of 0.6 % of GDP for a collection level of 6.2% of GDP.
The column ‘∆W (zero taxes)’ reports the total welfare cost of the tax
system. On average, replacing all taxes by a lump sum tax (or equivalently
in the model, eliminating all taxes), welfare could be increased by 0.8% of
GDP. This suggests that more than half of the deadweight loss of African
tax systems is due to the tax structure, rather than the revenue target.
The column ‘Std. Dev. MCFs’ reports the standard deviation of the base
case MCF estimates for the five tax instruments. To examine the correlation
between this measure of inefficiency and the potential welfare gains of optimal
distortionary taxes we performed a simple regression of the form ∆Wi =
aStDevi + b, where ∆Wi is the deadweight loss of current taxes relative to
optimal taxation, StDevi is the standard deviation of base case MCFs, and a
and b are coefficients to be estimated. The coefficient a was positive but the
result was statistically insignificant. We re-ran the regression without the
two outliers; Rwanda and Burkina Faso. The result was highly significant
(figures in parentheses are t-statistics) with R2 = 0.27:
∆W (optimal) = 0.22
(3.18)
+ 0.91
(3.61)
StDev.
As expected high variance of MCFs indicates scope for welfare-enhancing
revenue-neutral tax reform. We conclude that the standard deviation of
MCFs is a good predictor of the potential benefits of tax reform.
The column ‘MCF’ reports the MCF associated with optimal taxation.
The average figure is 1.07. This is well below the average figure forMCF(All)
reported in the base case estimates (1.17). Tax reform can potentially lower
the cost of public funds by a significant amount. If the MCF were actually
used as a criterion for project approval, moving to optimal taxes would permit
many more public projects to go ahead.
The ‘Revenue’ column reports tax revenue as a percentage of GDP. We
explored the relationship between tax revenue and tax system inefficiency
using simple linear regressions with tax revenue as the single explanatory
variable. We found tax revenue to be also a significant determinant of the
two deadweight loss measures.17
17Significant results are: ∆W (optimal) = 0.02(4.05)Revenue + 0.16(2.05), R2 = 0.31;
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Since they were both significant, we finally ran a regression with tax
revenue and with standard deviation of the base case MCF estimates as
explanatory variables.
∆W (optimal) = −0.15
(0.039)
+ 0.027
(0.000)
Revenue+ 1.06
(0.000)
StDev
The adjusted R2 of this regression is 0.68. Standard errors are reported
in brackets. The result shows that the taxation dead-weight loss increases
with the taxation level and with the dispersion of MCFs. The result is highly
significant. Revenue only explains part of the differences in the efficiency cost
of taxation, even when the effects of tax structure are removed (by finding
optimal imports and domestic taxes to achieve the given revenue). MCFs
dispersion explain another part. Contrary to what is often assumed in the
theoretical literature on regulation or in cost-benefit analysis, low MCFs do
not necessarily signal an efficient tax system. In fact the opposite may be the
case, as illustrated by our MCFs on the informal sector. The level of MCFs
is not an indication of efficiency. On the other hand, the dispersion of MCFs
is a valid signal of tax system efficiency.18
Collection levels in Africa are among the lowest in the world (see the
’Revenue’ column in table 8). Because of the size of the African informal
economy, we suspect that dispersion of their MCFs is among the widest in the
world, though we lack data to compare with other regions. Taxation reforms
should simultaneously aim at decreasing MCFs dispersion and increasing tax
revenue. Based on the preceding analysis this should be performed preferably
by targeting the informal economy.
7 Conclusion
Our results suggest that a reasonable estimate of the average MCF in Africa
is 1.17 (the average of MCF(All) across the 38 countries). Among the vari-
ous sensitivity tests that we conducted, this figure varied between 1.11 and
1.32. The estimate was most sensitive to changes in the consumer’s elasticity
of substitution between imports, domestic and untaxed. Senhadji’s (1998)
and∆W (zero taxes) = 0.04(4.26)Revenue+0.31(2.42), R2 = 0.34. Figures in parentheses
are t-statistics.
18At the theoretical optimum there is one MCF equal across all tax instruments. This
MCF increases with tax revenue.
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estimates of the elasticity of demand for imports supports our assumption
of unitary elasticity of substitution between imports and other goods. So
the major uncertainty concerning our base case estimates is the elasticity of
substitution between domestic and untaxed.
On average, taxes on factors have high MCFs and taxes on imports and
domestic goods have low MCFs. This outcome follows from the Diamond &
Mirrlees (1971) result for optimal taxation, that production decisions should
not be distorted. A major focus of tax reform in recent years has been the
introduction of VATs. Our results suggest that welfare could be improved by
increased reliance on these VATs, and reduced reliance on exports and factor
taxes.
An important finding is the strong relationship between the size of the
untaxed sector and the value of MCF (All) in the taxed sector. Moreover
the existence of MCF s lower than one in the informal sector suggests scope
for increasing welfare and tax revenue simultaneously. Measures to bring
currently informal activities within the tax base would be justified even if
a large proportion (up to 27%) of the additional revenue were consumed
in enforcement and administration. Auriol & Warlters (2005) suggest that
governments could reduce substantially the size of their informal sectors by
reducing red tape barriers to business entry into the formal sector. Such a
policy would not only help to enhance revenue by enlarging the tax base, but
would also reduce the marginal costs of public funds.
An obvious question is whether MCFs in Africa are higher or lower than
in rich countries. It is beyond the scope of this paper to estimate the MCF
in rich countries,19 but we suggest that differences in the MCF are probably
not strongly related to the wealth of the country. Our results suggest that
MCF (All) tends to be greater with higher tax revenue, greater use of corpo-
rate and personal income taxes, higher administrative costs, larger informal
sectors and greater use of export taxes. The first two of these factors tend
to occur in rich countries, while the final three factors tend to occur in poor
countries.
The potential extensions of this paper are numerous. Extensions to take
account of the dynamic effects of taxation on savings, investment and growth;
19There are several difficulties in adapting our model to rich countries. For example, the
European customs union must be modelled to examine import tariffs, and in the United
States, state level taxes vastly complicate the analysis. Social security taxes also need to
be taken into account. These difficulties are not insurmountable, but we leave them for
future research.
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or distributional considerations; or non-tax distortions such as labour-market
rigidities or regulated prices20 would all be useful. We hope, however, that
in the first instance the model we have presented can be applied to further
countries and across time periods, to provide a panel of MCF estimates.
These estimates would not only be useful for public policy analysis, but also
for the testing of numerous economic theories in which the MCF plays a role.
20Devarajan et al. (2001) have empirically shown that tax and non-tax distortions are
cumulative. Taxes in sectors with less total distortions tend to have lower MCFs because
they push resources towards highly-distorted sectors. The relative importance of tax and
non-tax distortions is a subject for further research.
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APPENDIX 1: Model Specification
The single representative consumer maximizes a CES utility function with
five goods: leisure (Z ), untaxed (U ), domestic (D), imports (M ), and invest-
ment (I ) subject to the income constraint.
Max W = W (Z,U,D,M, I) subject to PLZ+ p˜uU+ P˜DD+ P˜MM+ P˜II ≤ Y
A tilde over a price indicates that it is tax-inclusive:
P˜j = (1 + Tj)Pj,∀j ∈ {D,E,M,KfD, KfE, LfD, LfE}
Consumer income is the value of the endowments of foreign exchange (a¯),
time (T¯ ), and capital (K¯) plus the transfer received from the government
(R).
Y = a¯+ PLT¯ + PKK¯ +R
Leisure plus labour supply equals the time endowment.
Z + L = T¯
The consumer’s first order conditions are:
∂W/∂Z
PL
=
∂W/∂U
P˜U
=
∂W/∂D
P˜D
=
∂W/∂M
P˜M
=
∂W/∂I
PI
Factors are combined by CES production functions to produce intermediate
goods for untaxed (ψU), domestic (ψD), and exports (ψE). The factors used
are capital and labour, each of which may be formal (taxed) or informal
(untaxed). The notation for factors is sqr : the amount of factor s ∈ {K,L}
used to produce good r ∈ {U,D,E}, where q ∈ {i, f} indicates whether the
factor is informal or formal.
ψU = γU(K
i
U , L
i
U)
ψD = γD(K
i
D, K
f
D, L
i
D, L
f
D)
ψE = γE(K
i
E, K
f
E, L
i
E, L
f
E)
The 10 first order conditions determining factor usage in production are given
by:
∂ψr
∂sqr
=
P˜sqr
Pr
The intermediate goods are divided between final goods and investment using
CET production functions.
ψU = δU(XU , IU)
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ψD = δD(XD, ID)
ψE = δE(XE, IE)
The value of imports is equal to the value of exports plus the endowment
of foreign exchange.
P˜MXM = P˜EXE + A¯
Factor demand equals factor supply:
KiU +K
i
D +K
i
E +K
f
D +K
f
E = K¯
LiU + L
i
D + L
i
E + L
f
D + L
f
E = L
Factors receive the same after-tax return wherever employed:
Psqr = Ps,∀s ∈ {K,L},∀q ∈ {i, f},∀r ∈ {U,D,E}
Taxes are zero for the informal good and factors:
Tj = 0 ∀j ∈ {U, {sir}},∀s ∈ {K,L},∀r ∈ {U,D,E}.
Formal factors face the same tax rates whether producing exports or for-
mal goods. This permits simpler notation:
TK ≡ TKfr , TL ≡ TLfr ,∀r ∈ {D,E}
The numeraire is foreign exchange:
PwM = 1
Goods supply equals demand.
XU = U
XD = D
XM =M
IU + ID + IE = I
The transfer to the consumer is equal to tax revenue.
R = TEPEXE +TMPMXM +TDPDXD+TLPL(L
f
D+L
f
E)+TKPK(K
f
D+K
f
E)
Parameters in the model are: production and utility function parameters;
endowments of time, capital and foreign exchange; and tax rates. Parameter
values are determined by the calibration process.
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APPENDIX 2: DATA
The data required for the model are:
E exports (% of GDP)
M imports (% of GDP)
RD tax revenue from VATs and sales taxes (%GDP)
RE tax revenue from export taxes (% GDP)
RM tax revenue from import taxes (% GDP)
RK tax revenue from capital taxes (% GDP)
RL tax revenue from labour taxes (% GDP)
TD tax rate on domestic goods and services
TK tax rate on capital (corporate tax rate)
TL tax rate on labour
αU labour-output ratio in production of untaxed
αD labour-output ratio in production of domestic
αE labour-output ratio in production of exports
Country-specific data are set out in Table 9. All country-specific data
were obtained from IMF Statistical Annexes to country reports, available on
the internet at www.imf.org. Table 9 also reports the year for which the data
apply, and whether the country had a VAT in that year.
In the absence of data on labour-output ratios for all countries, the model
uses the average ratios for the five countries of Table 10, supposing that the
ratios are constant across all countries. These data are derived from so-
cial accounting matrices prepared by the International Food Policy Research
Institute. Among other data, the SAMs provide for each commodity: the
value-added by each factor; exports of each commodity; domestic demand for
the commodity; and goods taxes paid. Let Li denote the labour share of value
added for each commodity i. Let Ei denote exports of each commodity. The
first row in the table, the labour-output ratio for exports is then
P
i(Li×Ei)P
i Ei
.
Commodities are classified as untaxed if the taxes paid on the commodity
constitute less than 5% of the value of domestic output of the commodity,
and domestic if more than 5% is taxed. Let Uj be the value-added of untaxed
goods. The labour-output ratio for untaxed is then calculated as
P
j(Lj×Uj)P
j Uj
.
The same procedure is used to calculate the labour-output ratio for domestic.
The administrative costs of tax collection presented in Table 6 are derived
from various sources. For the United States: IRS Data Book, FY2002, avail-
able at: www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/02db30cs.xls; For other OECD countries
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Table 9: Country-Specific Data
Country year E M I RD RE RM RK RL TD TK TL VAT
Benin 2001 27.69 35.40 19.18 2.76 0.14 6.54 1.90 1.57 0.18 0.38 0.28 X
Botswana 2001 56.20 33.20 15.70 2.07 0.00 2.95 5.00 2.48 0.10 0.15 0.10 X
Burkina Faso 2001 9.34 23.38 19.50 3.66 0.42 3.32 1.28 1.32 0.18 0.20 0.15 X
Burundi 2000 7.79 21.23 8.39 9.16 0.00 3.40 1.57 3.91 0.20 0.40 0.50 -
Cameroon 2001 31.80 29.20 17.80 3.96 0.08 3.91 1.46 1.03 0.19 0.39 0.17 X
Cape Verde 2001 30.82 65.35 17.36 0.58 0.78 9.78 3.59 3.59 0.10 0.20 0.20 -
CAR 1999 16.78 23.83 14.41 2.76 1.12 2.36 0.52 1.00 0.18 0.30 0.31 -
Chad 2000 16.58 32.03 17.02 1.88 0.22 1.85 1.13 1.15 0.18 0.45 0.48 X
Congo 1999 21.90 25.59 24.10 1.03 0.05 0.74 0.27 0.49 0.03 0.40 0.35 -
Côte d’Ivoire 1999 44.33 37.46 16.30 4.82 2.56 4.60 2.08 1.68 0.20 0.35 0.27 X
Eq. Guinea 2001 106.02 125.60 56.79 0.63 0.45 0.28 1.67 0.39 0.06 0.25 0.10 -
Eritrea 2000 5.26 67.37 18.50 2.77 0.00 4.37 4.84 1.98 0.05 0.25 0.12 -
Ethiopia 2001 15.36 31.18 18.04 2.66 0.18 6.22 2.90 1.32 0.15 0.30 0.15 -
Gabon 2000 66.96 32.65 21.84 1.99 0.79 5.16 1.54 0.72 0.18 0.35 0.30 X
Gambia 1998 50.53 61.32 18.30 1.46 0.00 11.18 2.09 1.85 0.10 0.35 0.15 -
Ghana 1998 34.27 46.66 24.67 1.62 2.32 4.30 1.85 1.77 0.10 0.35 0.15 X
Guinea 1998 21.60 23.40 17.10 4.65 0.02 1.45 0.20 0.65 0.18 0.35 0.29 X
Guinea-Bissau 2001 27.21 57.71 18.92 0.74 2.61 4.30 0.92 0.95 0.15 0.39 0.10 -
Kenya 2000 26.47 36.39 15.55 6.62 0.00 5.96 3.45 3.45 0.15 0.30 0.15 X
Madagascar 2001 28.59 31.75 15.50 2.65 0.00 4.79 0.99 0.97 0.20 0.35 0.15 -
Malawi 1999 27.04 49.32 17.08 1.61 0.00 0.61 0.71 0.86 0.20 0.30 0.32 -
Mali 2000 25.50 37.50 20.60 2.32 0.22 6.22 1.31 1.12 0.18 0.35 0.29 X
Mauritania 2002 38.54 66.93 33.04 3.87 0.00 2.34 2.01 2.30 0.14 0.25 0.26 X
Mozambique 2001 21.90 38.50 41.64 3.99 1.98 3.22 0.73 1.27 0.17 0.45 0.15 X
Namibia 1997 52.62 58.17 19.75 4.54 0.00 9.62 5.03 6.00 0.10 0.40 0.20 -
Niger 2000 17.80 25.33 10.78 1.61 0.18 3.61 0.56 0.73 0.19 0.43 0.34 X
Nigeria 2000 53.27 37.54 17.70 1.37 0.00 2.77 1.22 1.09 0.05 0.30 0.20 X
Rwanda 2001 9.30 25.80 18.40 3.16 0.00 3.41 1.91 1.19 0.15 0.40 0.30 -
São Tomé 2000 35.32 82.44 43.49 0.41 0.05 10.20 1.81 2.71 0.35 0.30 0.13 -
Senegal 2000 30.50 39.60 19.10 4.64 0.00 8.48 1.91 2.20 0.20 0.35 0.44 X
South Africa 1999 25.70 24.40 16.50 5.87 0.00 1.00 3.60 10.70 0.14 0.30 0.30 X
Sudan 1999 8.11 15.13 16.70 1.29 0.07 2.85 0.90 0.12 0.10 0.40 0.20 -
Swaziland 2001 70.20 83.30 18.10 3.55 0.00 13.20 2.15 3.78 0.32 0.30 0.33 -
Tanzania 2002 15.90 24.50 17.00 2.51 0.00 4.67 0.66 1.55 0.20 0.30 0.25 X
Togo 1998 33.72 40.39 14.20 3.20 0.00 5.60 1.60 0.90 0.14 0.30 0.33 X
Uganda 1998 11.78 28.48 17.65 6.56 0.01 1.00 0.66 0.66 0.17 0.30 0.20 X
Zambia 1998 29.30 38.40 14.40 6.60 0.00 4.60 1.40 4.70 0.18 0.35 0.20 X
Zimbabwe 2000 29.81 31.00 15.55 6.00 0.00 2.59 3.89 10.86 0.15 0.30 0.30 -
Table 10: Labour-Output Ratios (%)
Malawi South Africa Tanzania Zambia Zimbabwe Average
export 38.08 56.14 33.58 19.39 37.09 36.86
domestic 48.34 48.28 33.59 39.37 46.82 43.28
untaxed 58.66 53.99 43.79 53.15 49.70 51.86
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– authors’ calculations based on the following tax agency annual reports:
Australia – ATO Annual Report 2002, available at www.ato.gov.au; United
Kingdom – Inland Revenue, Annual Report for the year ending 31st March
2002, available at www.inlandrevenue.gov.uk/pdfs/report2002.pdf; New Zea-
land – Inland Revenue Annual Report 2001-2002, available at: www.ird.govt.
nz/aboutir/reports/annual-02.pdf; and Canada: Canada Customs and Rev-
enue Agency, 2001-2002 Annual Report to Parliament, Financial Statements,
available at www.cra-arc.gc.ca/agency/ annual/2001-2002/. For Guatemala:
simple average of adjusted figures from Mann (2002). Ghana: revenue-
weighted average of figures cited by Terkper (1995). Namibia: statistics
provided by Klaus Schade of the Namibian Economic Policy Research Unit.
Tanzania: statistics provided by Odd-Helge Fjeldstad of the Chr. Michelsen
Institute. Remaining countries: Taliercio (2004). We are very grateful to
Klaus Schade, Odd-Helge Fjeldstad and Robert Taliercio for their assistance
in obtaining these data.
APPENDIX 3: Model Calibration
Benchmark quantities of goods and factors (entries in the SAM) are cal-
culated using the following equations:
XD =
RD
TD
production of domestic
XU = 100− E − I −XD −RD production of untaxed
XE = E −RE production of exports
XM =M −RM quantity of imports
A¯ = XM − E endowment of foreign exchange
IU = I
XU
XU+XD+XE
investment in untaxed
ID = I
XD
XU+XD+XE
investment in domestic
IE = I
XE
XU+XD+XE
investment in exports
KfD =
XD+ID
XD+ID+XE+IE
RK
TK
formal capital used to produce
domestic
KfE =
XE+IE
XD+ID+XE+IE
RK
TK
formal capital used to produce
exports
LfD =
XD+ID
XD+ID+XE+IE
RL
TL
formal labour used to produce do-
mestic
LfE =
XE+IE
XD+ID+XE+IE
RL
TL
formal labour used to produce ex-
ports
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LiD = αD(XD + ID)− (1 + TL)LfD informal labour used to produce
domestic
LiE = αE(XE + IE)− (1 + TL)LfE informal labour used to produce
exports
LiU = αU(XU + IU) informal labour used to produce
untaxed
KiD = (1−αD)(XD+ID)−(1+TK)KfD informal capital used to produce
domestic
KiE = (1−αE)(XE+IE)−(1+TK)KfE informal capital used to produce
exports
KiU = (1− αU)(XU + IU) informal capital used to produce
untaxed
K¯ = KfE +K
f
D +K
i
E +K
i
D +K
i
U total capital endowment
L = LfE + L
f
D + L
i
E + L
i
D + L
i
U total labour supply
T¯ = 1.05L endowment of time
Tax rates on exports and imports are calibrated, rather than being drawn
directly from the legal tax rates:
TE =
RE
XE
tax rate on exports
TM =
RM
XM
tax rate on imports
We do not observe price or quantities of goods, but we do observe the
total amount of money spent on each good (values as a percentage of GDP).
Following the Harberger convention we choose units of the aggregate goods
such that quantities equal values. This implies that initial prices equal one.
Where goods are taxed, goods units can be chosen such that either the gross
of tax or net of tax price equals one. We chose units such that the agent
supplying the good or factor received a price of one, with remaining prices
implied by tax rates:
PwM = 1 world price of imports (and for-
eign exchange)
PI = 1 price of investment
PU = 1 price of untaxed
PL = 1 wage received by labour (formal
or informal); also the wage paid
by producers for informal labour
PK = 1 wage received by capital (formal
or informal); also the wage paid
by producers for informal capital
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PD = 1 producer price of domestic
PE = 1 producer price of exports
An n-factor CES production function, F = A(
∑n
j=1 θjX
ρ
j )
1
ρ , with factors
Xj, share parameters θj, scale parameter A, and elasticity of substitution
σ = 1
1−ρ , can be rewritten in calibrated form as
F = F¯
[
n∑
i=1
(
p¯iX¯i∑n
j=1 p¯jX¯j
)(
Xi
X¯i
)ρ] 1ρ
where a bar over a variable indicates the observed benchmark level. The
benchmark factor demands, factor prices and product outputs, combined
with the elasticities of substitution fully specify the three production func-
tions. Indeed theory implies that the Cobb-Douglas coefficient in the base
case are θj = p¯iX¯iPn
j=1 p¯jX¯j
j = 1, ..., n. The same methodology can be used for
the CES utility function, where the Xis represent goods consumed, the pis
are goods prices, and the benchmark utility level is normalized to unity.
The calibration process is completed with the selection of substitution
elasticities for production and utility functions. In the absence of reliable
evidence on the magnitude of these elasticities for Africa we chose a base
case of σ = 1 for all four functions, and then ran sensitivity checks with
different values for σ.
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Table 11: Size of the Informal Sector (% GDP)
Country U Ki
DE
+ Li
DE
Total
Untaxed good sales informal factor in formal good
Benin 35.06 39.36 74.42
Botswana 5.34 25.92 31.26
Burkina Faso 47.16 18.93 66.09
Burundi 28.88 41.81 70.69
Cameroon 25.29 52.46 77.75
Cape Verde 45.44 -4.86 40.58
Central African Republic 50.72 29.99 80.71
Chad 54.11 25.22 79.33
Democratic Republic of Congo 18.53 71.60 90.13
Côte d’Ivoire 10.43 64.08 74.51
Equatorial Guinea -73.92 159.74 85.82
Eritrea 18.05 32.28 50.33
Ethiopia 46.22 17.72 63.94
Gabon -1.83 89.70 87.87
Gambia 15.13 57.74 72.87
Ghana 23.21 44.12 67.33
Guinea 30.83 54.11 84.94
Guinea-Bissau 48.20 23.05 71.25
Kenya 7.26 43.30 50.56
Madagascar 40.01 38.53 78.54
Malawi 46.23 35.85 82.09
Mali 38.66 38.35 77.02
Mauritania -3.05 77.49 74.44
Mozambique 9.03 65.76 74.80
Namibia -22.35 64.03 41.68
Niger 61.34 24.56 85.90
Nigeria 0.34 86.37 86.72
Rwanda 48.11 25.60 73.71
São Tomé 19.62 33.31 52.94
Senegal 22.56 52.57 75.13
South Africa 9.97 6.75 16.71
Sudan 60.97 21.37 82.34
Swaziland -3.07 74.72 71.65
Tanzania 52.02 23.72 75.74
Togo 26.02 55.74 81.77
Uganda 25.42 55.31 80.74
Zambia 11.99 45.63 57.62
Zimbabwe 8.61 6.16 14.77
Average 23.33 45.21 68.54
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